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Abstract 
  
The centrality of race to our history and the substantial racial inequalities 
that continue to pervade society ensure that "race" remains an 
extraordinarily salient and meaningful social category.  Explicit racial 
prejudice, however, is only part of the problem.  Equally important - and 
likely more pervasive - is the phenomenon of implicit racial prejudice: the 
cognitive processes whereby, despite even our best intentions, the human 
mind automatically classifies information in racial categories and against 
disfavoured social groups. Empirical research shows convincingly that 
these biases against socially disfavoured groups are (i) pervasive; (ii) often 
diverge from consciously reported attitudes and beliefs; and (iii) influence 
consequential behaviour towards the subjects of these biases. The 
existence of implicit racial prejudices poses a challenge to legal theory and 
practice. From the standpoint of a legal system that seeks to forbid 
differential treatment based upon race or other protected traits, if people 
are in fact treated differently, and worse, because of their race or other 
protected trait, then the fundamental principle of anti-discrimination has 
been violated. It hardly matters that the source of the differential treatment 
is implicit rather than conscious bias. This article investigates the relevance 
of this research to the law by means of an empirical account of how implicit 
racial bias could affect the criminal trial trajectory in the areas of policing, 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial decision-making.  It is the author's 
hypothesis that this mostly American research also applies to South Africa. 
The empirical evidence of implicit biases in every country tested shows that 
people are systematically implicitly biased in favour of socially privileged 
groups. Even after 1994 South Africa – similar to the US – continues to be 
characterised by a pronounced social hierarchy in which Whites 
overwhelmingly have the highest social status. The author argues that the 
law should normatively take cognizance of this issue.  After all, the mere 
fact that we may not be aware of, much less consciously intend, race-
contingent behaviour does not magically erase the harm. The article 
concludes by addressing the question of the appropriate response of the 
law and legal role players to the problem of implicit racial bias. 
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Virtue is a state of war, 
and to live in it 
we have to always combat with ourselves 
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
1 Introduction 
In the previous part of this article1 I examined the empirical evidence that 
shows implicit racial bias in society to be systematic, robust and pervasive. 
I also made out a case for why the law should take notice of implicit racial 
bias. In this part I continue the discussion of the relevance to the law of this 
body of research, with specific focus on implicit bias leading up to and in the 
courtroom. In this regard I give an empirical account of how implicit bias 
may potentially influence the criminal litigation trajectory.2 Next, I illustrate 
why this mostly United States research is relevant to South Africa. Then I 
consider some legal-normative issues surrounding implicit bias. I conclude 
by addressing the question of the appropriate response of the law and legal 
role players to the problem of implicit racial bias. 
2 The criminal litigation trajectory 
Since the individual actors in the criminal justice system are neither 
perceptibly nor cognitively nor behaviourally colour-blind, one could hardly 
expect the criminal justice system itself to be. In fact, an extensive body of 
empirical research in the United States has demonstrated that implicit racial 
biases may influence the perceptions, judgments and behaviour of police 
officers, prosecutors and judges, and hence the way in which Black 
defendants are treated and judged, as compared with their White 
counterparts.3 
Even the most cursory engagement with the American criminal justice 
system drives home the point forcefully that the United States "shuts behind 
bars an overwhelmingly disproportionate number of black and brown 
persons".4 The numbers are as stark as they are clear. Although African 
                                            
* Willem H Gravett. BLC LLB (UP) LLM (Notre Dame) LLD (UP). Senior Lecturer in 
Procedural Law, University of Pretoria; Member of the New York State Bar. Email: 
willem.gravett@up.ac.za. 
1  See PER / PELJ 2017 (20) - DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2017/v20n0a1312. 
2  I focus on the criminal litigation trajectory because, unlike the civil litigation context, in 
the criminal justice system it is not merely that implicit racial biases might lead to 
harmful discriminatory behaviour. In the context of criminal justice, where lives hang 
in the balance, the consequences might be catastrophic.  
3  Smith, Levinson and Robinson 2014 Ala L Rev 877; Kang et al 2012 UCLA L Rev 
1151. 
4  López 2010 Cal L Rev 1028. 
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Americans constitute only 13% of the US population, they make up almost 
1 000 000 (43%) of the total of 2 300 000 incarcerated persons.5 There is 
near universal agreement among commentators that the startling racial 
disparities that pervade the American justice system cannot simply be 
explained away as a function of poverty and poor choices.6 
Psychologists have explored and documented empirical evidence of 
longstanding implicit negative stereotypes of Blacks that pervade the 
American psyche.7 In the context of criminal justice, the stereotype most 
commonly applied to Blacks - or more specifically to young Black males - is 
that they are hostile, violent and prone to criminality.8 This implicit racial 
stereotype, in turn, creates a lens through which actors in the criminal justice 
system automatically perpetuate inequality.9  
Consider for example the crucial milestones in a criminal case flowing to 
trial. Firstly, on the basis of a crime report the police investigate particular 
areas and persons of interest and ultimately arrest a suspect. Secondly, the 
prosecutor decides to charge the suspect with a particular crime. Thirdly, 
the prosecutor makes recommendations and the presiding judicial officer 
makes decisions about bail and pre-trial detention. Fourthly, the defendant 
decides whether or not to accept a plea bargain after consulting his defence 
attorney or Legal Aid attorney. Fifthly, the case proceeds to trial, and the 
presiding officer not only manages the proceedings, but also makes 
decisions about evidentiary motions, objections, witness credibility and, 
ultimately, about the defendant's guilt. Finally, if the accused is convicted, 
the prosecutor makes sentencing recommendations and the presiding 
officer ultimately decides upon the appropriate sentence.  
Clearly, implicit biases need to sway only a few of the countless decisions 
at each stage along the spectrum of discretionary points to aggregate into 
a substantial effect. For the sake of manageability, I focus on some of the 
more striking experimental results that might feature during the police 
                                            
5  US Department of Justice 2015 https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf; 
NAACP 2016 http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet. One out of 
every nine African American males between the ages of 20 and 34 is incarcerated. 
Warren et al One in 100 34. In many large American cities more than half of the young 
Black men are under the control of the criminal justice system. Alexander New Jim 
Crow 16. 
6  See Smith, Levinson and Robinson 2014 Ala L Rev 872. 
7  See, for example, Devine and Elliot 1995 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 1139. 
8  Banks, Eberhardt and Ross 2006 Cal L Rev 1172. 
9  Smith, Levinson and Robinson 2014 Ala L Rev 874. 
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encounter, in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and in judicial 
decision-making at trial and sentencing.  
2.1 Police encounter 
On 4 February 1999 four New York City police officers saw a 23-year old 
West African immigrant, named Amadou Diallo, standing in front of his 
apartment building in a high-crime area of the Bronx. He seemed 
suspicious, so they decided to question him. Moments later, Diallo lay dead. 
The officers, believing that he was reaching for a gun, had fired 41 shots at 
him, 19 of which struck home. The item that Diallo was reaching for was not 
a gun, but his wallet. The officers were charged with second-degree murder. 
Their principal defence was that they genuinely believed their lives to be in 
danger. Their argument succeeded and they were acquitted.10 Moral 
outrage in response to this incident derived from a salient principle of justice: 
an individual should be judged on the basis of his conduct, not his social 
category. 
Of course, Diallo was by no means the only incident of white police officers 
mistakenly and fatally shooting an unarmed Black person in the United 
States in recent memory. In fact, there are a number of highly publicised 
incidents almost every year. Information compiled by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics indicates that African Americans are four times more likely than 
Whites to die during an encounter with a law enforcement officer.11  
However, it was the Diallo tragedy that spurred questions around the degree 
to which any implicit racial bias on the part of the police officers influenced 
their perceptions and decisions to open fire. In the wake of this incident, 
several laboratories created controlled environments analogous to the 
police officers' situation to examine the psychological underpinnings of 
implicit racial bias that could lead to such devastating results. 
Eberhardt et al12 demonstrated the bi-directional activation between "Black" 
and "criminality". When participants were subliminally primed with a Black 
male face as opposed to a White male face or no face at all, they were able 
to more quickly distinguish the faint outline of a weapon that slowly emerged 
                                            
10  Carpenter 2008 http://www.affirmact.blogspot.co.za/2008/05/buried-prejudice-bigot-
in-your-brain.html. For an in-depth discussion of the Diallo case, see Gladwell Blink 
189 et seq. 
11  Banks, Eberhardt and Ross 2006 Cal L Rev 1173. 
12  Eberhardt et al 2004 J Pers Soc Psychol 876. 
WH GRAVETT  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  5 
from visual static. Thus, by implicitly thinking "Black", the participants more 
quickly saw a weapon. 
Interestingly, this phenomenon also occurred in the reverse. Thus, not only 
did the idea of "Black" trigger weapons, but participants being subliminally 
primed with drawings of weapons also triggered visual attention more 
quickly to Black male faces than White male faces. 
It bears repeating that in this study the primes were all flashed 
subliminally.13 Thus, the behavioural differences in visually attending to 
Black faces and remembering them negatively in stereotyped ways were all 
triggered implicitly, without the participants' conscious awareness.14 
The experimenters also exposed participant police officers to a group of 
Black faces and a group of White faces and asked "Who looks criminal?" 
The police officers not only viewed more Black faces than White faces as 
criminal, but they also evaluated the most stereotypically Black faces (eg 
those faces with wide noses, thick lips or darker skin) as most criminal of 
all.15 
To directly explore the question whether people are prone to accidentally 
shoot Black suspects more often than White suspects, Correll16 developed 
a "shooter bias" paradigm video simulation. Participants are confronted with 
photographs of an individual (a "target") holding an object, superimposed 
on various city landscapes such as bust stops and parks. If the object is a 
weapon, the participant has to press one key to shoot. If the object is 
harmless (such as a cell phone, wallet or cold drink) the participant must 
press another key to holster the weapon. 
Not surprisingly, under severe time pressure the participants made 
mistakes. However, their mistakes were not randomly distributed. Shooting 
behaviour systematically correlated with the race of the target. Participants 
were quicker to shoot when the target was Black than when the target was 
White. Also, participants made more mistakes (false alarms) and shot more 
unarmed Black targets than unarmed White targets. Conversely, they failed 
to shoot more armed White targets (misses) than armed Black targets.17  
                                            
13  The photograph flashed for only 30 milliseconds. 
14  Kang et al 2012 UCLA L Rev 1137. 
15  Banks, Eberhardt and Ross 2006 Cal L Rev 1172; Smith, Levinson and Robinson 
2014 Ala L Rev 882. 
16  Correll et al 2002 J Pers Soc Psychol 1314. 
17  Correll et al 2002 J Pers Soc Psychol 1317, 1319. 
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The experimenters were surprised to find that these results were consistent 
in both White and Black participants.18 Thus, the race of the participant did 
not have any impact on shooter bias. This suggests that shooter bias is 
firmly rooted in the culturally held implicit racial stereotype linking Blacks to 
danger.19  
2.2 Prosecutorial discretion 
Consider the first decision that a prosecutor makes in most criminal cases: 
whether or not to charge the suspect and, if so, with what crime or crimes. 
This charging power is inherently an expression of mercy, ie should the 
legitimate power of the State be reined in or not? However, as the US 
Supreme Court noted in McCleskey v Kemp:20 "[T]he power to be lenient is 
also the power to discriminate". 
It is trite that prosecutors exercise vast and largely un-reviewable discretion 
in their charging and plea-bargaining decisions.21 Studies in the United 
States have routinely found that prosecutors - the vast majority of whom 
would never consciously intend to hold double standards based upon race 
- exercise this discretion in racially biased ways, contributing significantly to 
the racial disparities in the criminal justice system.22 
For example, a 1985 study found Los Angeles prosecutors more likely to 
press charges against Black than White defendants - a disparity that could 
not be accounted for by race-neutral factors, such as a prior record, the 
seriousness of the charge or the use of a weapon.23 Similar studies in 
Florida and Indiana in the late 1980s also found charging discrepancies 
based upon the race of the defendant.24 A US Sentencing Commission 
Report disclosed that federal prosecutors were more disposed to offer White 
                                            
18  Correll et al 2002 J Pers Soc Psychol 1324. 
19  Levinson 2007 Duke LJ 358. 
20  McCleskey v Kemp 481 US 279 312 (1987). 
21  From the arrest of a suspect to sentencing of the defendant, consider the range of 
discretion-based decisions that prosecutors must make on a daily basis: Should an 
arrested person be charged with a crime? What crime or crimes should be charged? 
Should bail be recommended or opposed? At what level should bail be 
recommended? Should the charges be dropped? Should a plea bargain be offered or 
negotiated? What sentence will be recommended? 
22  See generally Rehavi and Starr Racial Disparity. 
23  Radelet and Pierce 1985 L Soc Rev 615-619. 
24  See sources cited in Kang et al 2012 UCLA L Rev n 56. 
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defendants generous plea bargains, with sentences below prescribed 
sentencing guidelines, than to offer them to Black or Latino defendants.25  
In order to get a sense of how implicit racial bias might skew prosecutorial 
decisions in a racially biased manner, consider two scenarios of self-
defence with identical facts, except for the race of the victim: in one the 
victim is Black, and in the other White.26 The suspect in each claims self-
defence, and alleges specifically that he accidentally bumped into the 
deceased outside a pub at night. The deceased became angry and warned 
the suspect that "He's going to get it!" The suspect contends that, at this 
point, the deceased reached towards his waist and started pulling out a 
shiny object. The suspect, believing that the deceased was reaching for a 
gun, pulled out his own handgun and fatally shot the deceased. 
In order to assess the strength of the self-defence claim to determine 
whether charges should be brought for murder or whether a plea-bargain 
for manslaughter or some other less serious offence might be appropriate, 
prosecutors must make an instinctual judgment: did the suspect reasonably 
believe that the deceased was reaching for a weapon? 
This judgment is not made in a race-neutral vacuum. As described above, 
empirical research bears out that most Americans (and, as I argue below, 
this is likely the case for most South Africans as well) hold implicit racial 
stereotypes that associate Blacks with aggression and hostility and, 
specifically, that associate Blacks with weapons. Applying this research to 
the scenario above, it is more than likely that prosecutors would perceive 
the Black victim as having reached for a weapon. 
By contrast, IAT findings suggest that people hold positive stereotypes 
about Whites, such as "law-abiding", "trustworthy" and "successful", and 
specifically that they dissociate Whites and weapons.27 Prosecutors would 
therefore likely be more inclined to accept that the White victim was 
reaching for his cell phone and, thus, that the suspect acted unreasonably. 
Of course, these dynamics would be amplified in a cross-racial shooting, 
because implicit racial bias would affect the evaluation of both the suspect 
and the victim's behaviour. 
                                            
25  US Sentencing Commission Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 2000 
http//www.protectcivilrights.org/pdf/reports/justice.pdf. 
26  See Smith and Levinson 2011 Seattle U L Rev 806-807. 
27  Smith and Levinson 2011 Seattle U L Rev 808. 
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I do not suggest that prosecutors consciously think about a Black suspect 
or victim and consciously decide that Blacks are hostile and violent, and 
therefore that they are more likely to shoot or that they can more justifiably 
be shot. In fact, most prosecutors would expressly - and genuinely - disavow 
such conscious thought processes. However, as emphasised in the first part 
of this contribution, these negative stereotypes operate subconsciously and 
automatically. That is what makes implicit racial bias so insidious. 
What about defence attorneys? In general one might think that - because 
they are frequently put in the role of interacting with clients belonging to 
disfavoured social groups and because they are often ideologically and 
professionally committed to racial equality - defence attorneys as a group 
might have implicit racial biases materially different from the rest of the 
population. However, Eisenberg and Johnson found evidence to the 
contrary. As measured by the IAT, capital punishment defence attorneys 
show implicit racial bias against Blacks approximately to the same extent as 
does the population at large.28  
2.3 Judicial decision-making 
A judge - the archetype of the impartial actor in the criminal justice system 
- exercises significant discretion in the typical criminal trial in setting bail, 
deciding motions, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, presiding over the 
trial, rendering a verdict, and sentencing the defendant. If ordinary adults 
carry a "bigot in the brain", as an article in Scientific American Mind referred 
to implicit biases, then data collected by Rachlinski et al29suggest that:  
[A]n invidious homunculus might reside in the heads of most judges in the 
United States, with the potential to produce racially biased distortions in the 
administration of justice. 
Before returning to the Rachlinski et al study, let us consider a broader 
statistical overview of evidence of racial bias in bail setting and sentencing 
which, in the United States as in South Africa, falls squarely within the 
purview of the trial judge. A study of bail setting in Connecticut found that 
judges set bail at amounts that were 25% higher for Black defendants than 
for similarly situated White defendants.30 Empirical data from Washington 
State also suggests that defendants from disfavoured social groups receive 
                                            
28  Eisenberg and Johnson 2004 De Paul L Rev 1545-1555. 
29  Rachlinski et al 2009 Notre Dame L Rev 1221. 
30  Ayres and Waldfogel 1994 Stan L Rev 992. 
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less favourable pre-trial detention determinations than their White 
counterparts.31 
Federal judges imposed sentences on African Americans that were 12% 
longer than those imposed on comparable White defendants.32 Research 
on capital punishment in the United States reveals that "killers of White 
victims are more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of Black 
victims".33 Black defendants are also more likely than White defendants to 
receive the death penalty.34 
To test whether these racial disparities might be ascribed to judges' implicit 
biases, legal and social cognition scholars have conducted experimental 
studies holding everything constant except for race. Blair and her 
colleagues35 took photographs from a database of criminals convicted in 
Florida and asked participants to judge how Afrocentric both Black and 
White defendants look on a scale from one to nine. The goal was to 
determine whether race correlated with actual sentencing. After controlling 
for the seriousness of the offences and other factors, the researchers found 
that the race of the defendant was statistically insignificant. Thus, White and 
Black defendants were sentenced without discrimination based upon race. 
However, they found another curious correlation: within each race, either 
Black or White, the more Afrocentric the defendant looked, the harsher his 
punishment.36 The researchers concluded that, even when controlling for 
differences in criminal history, those defendants who possessed the most 
stereotypically Black facial features (relative to other members of their racial 
group) received, on average, sentences nearly eight months longer than 
those who possessed the least stereotypically Black features.37 
The researchers postulated that implicit racial bias explained these results. 
If judges are motivated to avoid racial discrimination, they may be on guard 
against the danger of treating similarly situated Black and White defendants 
                                            
31  Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System Preliminary Report 28. 
32  Mustard 2001 J L & Econ 300. 
33  US General Accounting Office "Death penalty sentencing: Research indicated pattern 
of racial disparities" Report to the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary 
(2012) as cited in Banks, Eberhardt and Ross 2006 Cal L Rev 1175. This finding holds 
even when statistically controlling for a wide variety of non-racial factors that may 
influence sentencing, and has been characterised by the US General accounting office 
as "remarkably consistent across data sets, states, data collection methods and 
analytic technique". Banks, Eberhardt and Ross 2006 Cal L Rev 1175.  
34  Baldus et al 1998 Cornell L Rev 1710-1714. 
35  Blair, Judd and Chapleau 2004 Psychol Sci 675. 
36  Blair, Judd and Chapleau 2004 Psychol Sci 677. 
37  Blair, Judd and Chapleau 2004 Psychol Sci 677-678. 
WH GRAVETT  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  10 
disparately. By contrast, judges have no conscious awareness that 
Afrocentric features might trigger implicit negative stereotypes of criminality 
and violence that could influence their judgment. Without such awareness, 
and with this bias operating automatically, they could not explicitly control 
for or correct the potential bias.38 
Rachlinski et al recruited participants at judicial education conferences, 
which gave them a unique opportunity to test a participant pool of willing 
judges.39 They administered to the judge participants the "Black/White and 
"Good/Bad" IAT. The researchers then asked them to make decisions in 
two hypothetical court scenarios in which the race of the legal actor was 
ambiguous and was subliminally primed. Lastly, they were asked to decide 
a hypothetical case in which the race of the legal actor was explicitly stated 
as either Black or White.40 
The results of this research support three conclusions. Firstly, judges, like 
the rest of us, carry implicit biases concerning race. The researchers found 
a "strong white preference" among the White judges - in fact "significantly 
stronger" than that observed among White participants on the IAT 
generally.41 The Black judges, by contrast, demonstrated no clear 
preference overall.42 Secondly, these implicit biases can affect judges' 
judgment, at least in the context of the two scenarios in which race was only 
subliminally primed, and the judges were thus unaware of a need to monitor 
their own decisions for racial bias.43 Thirdly, and conversely, in the third 
scenario, in which the race of the actor was stated explicitly and the judges 
were thus aware of the need to monitor their own responses for the influence 
of implicit racial bias, they seemed motivated to suppress that bias and 
appeared able to do so.44 The authors of the study conclude:45 
                                            
38  Blair, Judd and Chapleau 2004 Psychol Sci 677. Also see the discussion in Kang et 
al 2012 UCLA L Rev 1150.  
39  The 133 judges who participated in the study came from three jurisdictions. Rachlinski 
et al 2009 Notre Dame L Rev 1205. 
40  Rachlinski et al 2009 Notre Dame L Rev 1209, 1212, 1217. 
41  Among the 85 judges, 74 (or 87.1%) showed a White preference on the IAT. Rachlinski 
et al 2009 Notre Dame L Rev 1210-1211. 
42  Black judges carry a more diverse array of implicit biases, just like Black adults 
generally. Approximately one third exhibit a White preference similar to the White 
judges, approximately one third exhibit a Black preference, and approximately one 
third exhibit no preference at all. Rachlinski et al 2009 Notre Dame L Rev 1210. 
43  Rachlinski et al 2009 Notre Dame L Rev 1221. 
44  Rachlinski et al 2009 Notre Dame L Rev 1221. 
45  Rachlinski et al 2009 Notre Dame L Rev 1232. 
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The presence of implicit racial bias among judges … should sound a 
cautionary note for those involved in the criminal justice system. 
Indeed, the research findings with regard to the ways in which implicit racial 
bias might influence decision-making in criminal cases are substantial and 
robust. All these studies, in the aggregate, suggest that implicit racial bias 
in the trial process is a problem worth worrying about.46  
3 Applicability of implicit bias research to South Africa 
One might legitimately ask what the possible relevance would be for this - 
mostly American - research to the South African legal context. It is my 
hypothesis, which is of course subject to empirical verification in the course 
of time, that the research results in the United States would generally hold 
true for South Africa as well.  
The empirical evidence of implicit biases in every country tested47 clearly 
shows that these biases are not randomly oriented. Rather, people are 
systematically implicitly biased in favour of socially privileged groups, ie 
groups higher in the social hierarchy.48 For example, in many societies, 
including those of North America and Europe, children of both higher and 
lower status racial groups show preferences for Whites over other races, 
because they prefer adults and other children of higher status and they view 
race as indicative of social standing.49  
This is also the case in South Africa. A 2011 study reveals that Black, 
Coloured and White children showed highly similar race preferences: all 
preferred White and Coloured to Black South Africans, even though Blacks 
comprise the largest proportion of South Africa's population.50 The reason 
for this phenomenon is not difficult to discern. Since the end of apartheid, 
South Africa has overcome great obstacles and made many strides in 
overcoming social injustices. However, demographic data reveal that, even 
post 1994, South Africa continues to be characterised by a pronounced 
social hierarchy in which Whites overwhelmingly have the highest social 
                                            
46  See Kang et al 2012 UCLA L Rev 1168. 
47  Thus far, approximately 90% of test takers have been American. Lee 2008 UC Davis 
L Rev 539. However, implicit bias has also been found against "outgroups" in other 
countries, eg, Aborigines in Australia, Turkish immigrants in Germany (see Dasgupta 
2004 Soc Justice Res 147) and Koreans in Japan (Kang Implicit Bias 3). 
48  Eg, young over old, light-skinned over dark-skinned, non-Arab non-Muslims over Arab 
Muslims, abled over disabled, thin over obese, and straight over gay. Kang et al 2010 
JELS 887; Kang and Lane 2010 UCLA L Rev 474. 
49  Shutts et al 2011 Dev Sci 1289. 
50  Shutts et al 2011 Dev Sci 1285. 
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status. Although there are large income disparities in the United States as 
well, South Africa's racial hierarchy predicated on wealth is particularly 
extreme.51 Whereas Black Americans' average annual income is 
approximately 60% of that of White Americans,52 in South Africa the 
analogous figure is 13%.53  
Thus, the economic stratification of latter-day South African society seems 
to continue to send overt messages about which groups are valued over 
others. In South Africa race appears to be a social category that is 
particularly deeply associated with differences in wealth. In addition to 
children's general tendency to associate higher status racial groups with 
higher value belongings, South African children tend to prefer individuals 
who are members of these higher status racial groups (ie White over 
Coloured and Coloured over Black).54 Information that runs counter to this 
strong association between wealth (social status) and race - such as the 
increasing presence of the Black middle and upper class, the rise of Black 
political and social power, and the fact that Blacks are the statistical majority 
- is not enough to eliminate the perception of this association from the minds 
of young South Africans.55 In sum, South African children of all racial groups 
- like children in North America and Europe - demonstrate preferences 
congruent with the de facto racial hierarchy in their societies. 
This raises the question: why do members of socially disadvantaged groups 
often prefer members of other, more dominant or advantaged groups? One 
possible explanation for the link between historical and cultural 
discrimination and implicit racial biases is what social cognitionists refer to 
as "system justification theory" (SJT).  
SJT posits that people are motivated to defend, justify, rationalise and 
perpetuate the social status quo, even if that status quo was arrived at 
accidentally, arbitrarily or unjustly.56 SJT can, for example, be seen in the 
"paradox of the free market", ie the faith in the legitimacy of the free market 
system among the poor, despite the growing inequality between rich and 
poor.57 Be it for reasons of uncertainty avoidance (consistency), intolerance 
                                            
51  Newheiser et al 2014 Dev Psychol 3.  
52  US Census Bureau 2011 as cited in Newheiser et al 2014 Dev Psychol 3. 
53  Statistics South Africa 2008 as cited in Newheiser et al 2014 Dev Psychol 3. Also see 
Olson et al 2012 Child Development 1886. 
54  Olson et al 2012 Child Development 1896. 
55  Olson et al 2012 Child Development 1896. See also Dunham et al 2014 Social 
Cognition 16. 
56  Blasi and Jost 2006 Cal L Rev 1124; Jolls and Sunstein 2006 Cal L Rev 990. 
57  As another example, a number of studies have shown that women, as well as other 
individuals in low-paying jobs, come to feel that they deserve lower wages than men 
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of ambiguity (coherence), or the need for order, structure and closure 
(certainty), the evidence clearly indicates that many members of low-status 
groups find the devil they know to be less threatening than the devil they do 
not know.58 
4 Some normative issues surrounding implicit bias and 
the law 
Drawing on socio-biology and evolutionary psychology, some scholars have 
objected to any attempt by the law to address implicit biases, on the theory 
that implicit biases are hardwired and there is nothing that we can do about 
them.59 Just as we may be hardwired to be averse to snakes and fond of 
our parents' smiles, so the argument goes, we may simply be hardwired 
through thousands of years of natural selection to dread other races and 
love our own.  
Moreover, the law is society's effort to rationalise our relationships with one 
another; the system through which society attempts to define obligations 
and responsibilities.60 If implicit racial bias is located so deeply in human 
cognition that we have, for the most part, no conscious awareness of it, why 
should the law take cognisance of these stereotype-driven phenomena that 
we, for the most part, do not personally endorse? As Banaji, 61 one of the 
inventors of the IAT, explains: "Mind bugs ... are not special things that 
happen in our heart because we are evil". 
Firstly, as a normative matter, we should not conflate "is" and "ought". Even 
were it arguendo descriptively true that we are hardwired to be implicitly 
biased in favour of our "race", that does not in any way address what the 
law should do about it normatively. After all, the mere fact that we may not 
be aware of, much less consciously intend, such race-contingent behaviour 
does not magically erase the harm. Assumptions - even implicit ones - lead 
to attitudes, and attitudes in turn lead to choices with moral and political 
consequences. In Price Waterhouse v Hopkins,62 Justice Brennan, writing 
                                            
or other more highly paid individuals. For example, even in a feminist environment - 
Yale University in the 1990s - when women were asked to assign a value to their work 
they "paid themselves" 18% less than men did for work that was indistinguishable in 
quality or content. Jost 1997 Psychol Women Q 387. 
58  Jost and Hunyady 2005 Curr Dir Psychol Sci 269. 
59  See Kang and Lane 2010 UCLA L Rev 509; Kang 2005 Harv L Rev 1531. 
60  Lawrence 1987 Stan L Rev 329. 
61  As quoted in Vedantam 2005 http://www.washingtonpost.com/we-dyn/articles/ 
A27067-2005Jan21.html.  
62  Price Waterhouse v Hopkins 490 US 228 (1989). 
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for a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in the context of implicit 
gender discrimination, stated: 
[U]nwitting or ingrained bias is no less injurious or worthy of eradication than 
blatant or calculated discrimination … The fact that some or all of the partners 
at Price Waterhouse may have been unaware of that motivation, even within 
themselves, neither alters the fact of its existence nor excuses it.  
Secondly, most conceptions of justice argue that people are entitled to 
certain rights derived from their shared humanity. Two salient features of 
stereotypes are (i) that they mask individuality (the stereotyper fails to be 
sensitive to an individual's unique characteristics); and (ii) that they lead to 
"moral distancing". In moral distancing the stereotyper sees an individual as 
more "other" than he or she really is, and this corrodes the sense of a 
common, shared humanity.63 History attests to the connection between 
dehumanisation and moral license - those who are dehumanised are 
pushed out beyond the scope of rights that would guard against the most 
egregious atrocities. 
Studies demonstrating the link between implicit racial biases and 
dehumanisation provide forceful examples of implicit racial biases' moral 
and legal relevance. In this context, consider the following examples of the 
use of animal imagery in relation to Black defendants in actual court cases. 
In Darden v Wainwright,64 the prosecutor referred to the Black defendant in 
closing argument as an "animal" that "shouldn't be out of his cell unless he 
has a leash on him and a prison guard at the other end of that leash". And, 
in a Louisiana case in 200265 the prosecutor referred to the Black 
defendants as "animals like that" and implored the jury to "send a message 
to that jungle". 
In a compelling empirical study Goff et al66 investigated the implicit 
association between "Black" and "ape". To test for the implicit presence of 
this subjugating metaphor they subliminally primed participants with either 
Black or White faces and then asked them to identify, as fast as possible, 
perceptually degraded images of apes that slowly came into focus.67 When 
primed with a consciously undetectable image of a Black face, participants 
were able to identify the ape in fewer frames. Conversely, when primed with 
                                            
63  Kelly and Roedder 2008 Philosophy Compass 532. 
64  Darden v Wainwright 477 US 168 180 (1986) as cited in Smith and Levinson 2011 S 
Seattle U L Rev 819-820. 
65  S v Harris 820 So 2d 471 (2002) as cited in Smith and Levinson 2011 Seattle U L Rev 
820. 
66  Goff et al 2008 J Pers Soc Psychol 292.  
67  Goff et al 2008 J Pers Soc Psychol 303-305. 
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a consciously undetectable White face, participants required more frames 
to detect the ape than when they received no prime at all.68 This study 
confirmed that people - most of whom explicitly claimed not to have even 
heard of the stereotype linking Blacks with apes - nonetheless implicitly 
associated Blacks with apes. 
In a related study Goff and his colleagues performed a content analysis of 
the media coverage surrounding 600 death penalty-eligible criminal cases 
prosecuted in Philadelphia between 1979 and 1999. The study revealed that 
coverage of Black defendants in the Inquirer, Philadelphia's major daily 
newspaper, included on average four times the number of ape-like 
metaphors and imagery than coverage of White capital defendants.69 Even 
more disconcertingly, the research found a strong correlation between the 
number of times a dehumanising animalistic reference was made and the 
likelihood that the defendant received the most severe punishment.70 
5 Conclusion 
Most of us would like to be free of biases and stereotypes that lead us to 
judge individuals based upon the social categories to which they belong, 
such as race. But wishing things do not make them so. The best scientific 
evidence suggests that most of us - regardless of how hard we try to be fair 
and objective and regardless of how deeply we believe in our own objectivity 
- harbour implicit mental biases that might very well alter our behaviour.71 
The accumulated hard data, collected from scientific experiments 
conducted with mathematical precision, objective measurements and 
statistical dissection, forces us - as Justice van der Westhuizen urged72 - to 
see through the facile assumptions of our own "colour-blindness". 
Confronted with robust research suggesting the pervasiveness of implicit 
bias on decision-making, should we, as lawyers and judges and legal 
scholars, strive to be behaviourally realistic, recognise our all-too-human 
frailties, and design systems and procedures to attempt to decrease the 
impact of implicit bias in the courtroom? I submit that our duty as faithful 
stewards of the judicial system demands no less. A judicial system that 
embraces a mission of social justice, while simultaneously being hamstrung 
                                            
68  Goff et al 2008 J Pers Soc Psychol 303-305. 
69  Goff et al 2008 J Pers Soc Psychol 303-305. 
70  Goff et al 2008 J Pers Soc Psychol 303-305. 
71  See Kang et al 2012 UCLA L Rev 1186. 
72  PER / PELJ 2017(20) - DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2017/v20n0a1312. 
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by decision-making processes that might be implicitly racially biased, is 
simply indefensible.  
What then, can we do about implicit biases in the courtroom? The public 
should ideally view the court system as the single institution that is most 
unbiased, impartial, fair and just. Yet the typical trial courtroom mixes 
together many people, often strangers, from different social backgrounds, 
in an intense, stressful, emotional and often hostile social environment. In 
such an environment a complex jumble of implicit and explicit biases will 
inevitably be active. It is the primary responsibility of the judge to manage 
this complex and bias-rich environment to the end that fairness and justice 
be done - and be seen to be done. 
The good news is that implicit biases are malleable, ie they are not 
impervious to change. On the personal level, one potentially effective 
strategy to alter implicit bias about race is to expose ourselves to counter-
typical exemplars.73 For example, in a longitudinal study, Dasgupta and 
Asgari74 tracked the implicit gender stereotypes held by female subjects 
both before and after attending a year of college. One group of women 
attended a co-educational college, while the other attended a single-sex 
college. At the commencement of their college careers both groups had 
comparable levels of implicit stereotypes against women.75 However, after 
one year, those who attended the women-only institution on average 
expressed no implicit gender bias, whereas the average gender bias of 
those who attended the co-educational college actually increased.76 After 
carefully accounting for the other environmental variables of the two 
universities (e.g. coursework and extra-curricular activities), the researchers 
concluded that it was exposure to an environment in which women 
frequently occupied counter-stereotypic leadership roles (professors and 
administrators) that altered the implicit gender stereotypes of female college 
students.77  
Research has also shown that when a person forms a new personal 
connection with a member of a previously devalued out-group, implicit 
attitudes and stereotypes towards that group may change rapidly and 
                                            
73  Kang et al 2012 UCLA L Rev 1169. 
74  Dasgupta and Asgari 2004 J Exp Soc Psychol 642. Although the longitudinal field 
study explored implicit gender bias, Kang expresses the opinion that we should not be 
surprised to see similar results in the near future with regard to implicit racial bias. 
Kang 2005 Harv L Rev 1562. 
75  Both groups viewed women stereotypically as more "supportive" than "agentic". 
76  Dasgupta and Asgari 2004 J Exp Soc Psychol 651. 
77  Dasgupta and Asgari 2004 J Exp Soc Psychol 651-653. 
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dramatically.78 Such evidence gives further impetus to efforts to increase 
the diversity of the Bench and courtroom. 
On the legal institutional level, the implicit social cognition research bears 
out that the conditions under which implicit biases translate most readily into 
discriminatory behaviour are when people have wide discretion in making 
quick decisions with little accountability.79 Judges function in just such an 
institutional environment. Courtrooms can be busy places, often requiring 
judges to make almost instantaneous decisions on motions, trial objections, 
witness credibility and the like in high-pressure situations. The research 
makes clear that unwanted prejudicial responses are most likely to occur 
under conditions of distraction or cognitive overload that do not afford 
judges the time necessary to actively engage in the corrective cognitive 
processes to control the "bigot in the brain".80 
The evidence also suggests that believing ourselves to be objective puts us 
at particular risk for susceptibility to implicit biases and behaving in ways 
that belie our self-conception. This is precisely what Justice van der 
Westhuizen cautioned us about. Judges should therefore remind 
themselves that they are human and fallible, notwithstanding their status, 
their education and the robe.  
Most judges view themselves as objective and especially talented at fair 
decision-making. For example in one survey Rachlinski et al81 found that 
97% of judges (35 out of 36) believed that they were in the top quartile "in 
avoid[ing] racial prejudice in decision-making" relative to other judges who 
attended the same conference. That is obviously statistically impossible. In 
another survey more than 97% of the administrative judges surveyed 
ranked themselves in the top 50% in terms of avoiding bias – again, this is 
mathematically impossible.82 
Closely connected to doubting one's objectivity is the strategy of 
consciously increasing one's motivation to be fair. Social psychologists 
generally agree that motivation is an important determinant in checking 
biased behaviour.83 It may be difficult to correct biases even when we do 
                                            
78  Lowery, Hardin and Sinclair 2001 J Pers Soc Psychol 842. 
79  Kang et al 2012 UCLA L Rev 1142. 
80  Rachlinski et al 2009 Notre Dame L Rev 1225; Levinson 2007 Duke LJ 379; Lee 2008 
UC Davis L Rev 543. 
81  Rachlinski et al 2009 Notre Dame L Rev 1210. 
82  Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich 2009 Duke LJ 1519. 
83  Fazio and Towles-Schwen "The MODE model of attitude behaviour: The introspection 
illusion as a source of the bias blind spot" as cited in Kang et al 2012 UCLA L Rev 
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know about them. However, if we trust our own explicit self-reports about 
our biases - namely, that we have none - we will have no motivation to self-
correct. Unfortunately, as far as biases are concerned, we often readily see 
the splinter in our neighbour's eye while ignoring the mote in our own.  
A powerful way to increase judicial motivation would be for judges to gain 
scientific knowledge about implicit social cognition. This would require that 
judges become internally persuaded that a genuine problem exists. Judges 
in the United States are already studying what might be done. For example, 
the National Center for State Courts has a dedicated working group on 
implicit biases and it has produced a primer on the subject for judges.84  
As part of judicial education, judges should be encouraged to take the IAT. 
It might assist newly appointed judges to understand the extent to which 
they have implicit racial biases and alert them to the need to correct for 
these biases when they take the Bench. It would also serve to counter the 
phenomenon that when a sense of power is bestowed on people, they tend 
to show greater bias than they did before.85 To be clear, the suggestion is 
not that testing should be mandatory for judicial candidates or that their 
results should be disclosed. To be effective, judges should be "confronted" 
with their IAT results in a thoughtful and controlled manner that fosters 
introspection and avoids defensive responses.  
In addition to providing training, the judicial system could also alter actual 
practices in the courtroom to minimise the untoward impact of implicit 
biases. In this regard, Rachlinski et al suggests the use of three-judge trial 
courts in all instances,86 improving the diversity of appellate court panels,87 
and increasing the depth of appellate scrutiny by employing de novo review 
in cases in which particular trial court findings of fact might be tainted by 
implicit bias.88  
                                            
84  See National Center for State Courts http://www.ncsonline. 
org/D_research/ref/implicit/html. 
85  Vedantam 2005 http://www.washingtonpost.com/we-dyn/articles/A27067-
2005Jan21.html. 
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I am mindful of the potential costs of these interventions. However, if there 
are cost-effective interventions I believe that they should be adopted, at 
least on an experimental basis. I recognise that these suggestions are 
starting points and that they may not all be effective. However, to render 
justice blind - as it is supposed to be - these reforms are worth considering. 
The general goal of this contribution is not to take a position on how the 
discoveries in implicit social cognition research should inform the law. 
Rather it is to reveal to South African legal practitioners and scholars who 
are unfamiliar with implicit racial bias and its potential consequences (i) the 
robustness of the empirical evidence that much of human cognition can and 
does occur without introspective access; (ii) that such implicit mental 
processes nevertheless guide and influence decision-making; and (iii) that 
the costs incurred by individuals and social groups come at the hands not 
only of the malign, but also from the unaware and uncontrolled mental acts 
of well-intentioned people.  
In short, this contribution suggests that the research findings surrounding 
implicit racial bias provide a more behaviourally accurate understanding of 
the continued perpetuation of racial disparities in the judicial system. It 
seeks be useful to lawyers and judges of good faith who conclude that 
implicit racial bias in the courtroom is a problem worth worrying about, but 
do not know quite what to do about it. I also hope to provoke those who are 
more skeptical about the legal relevance of implicit racial bias to engage in 
substantive debate about implicit biases, "colour-blindness" and the law 
past caricatures. 
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